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A B S T R A C T
The United Kingdom (UK) has placed itself on a transition towards a low-carbon economy and society, through
the imposition of a goal of reducing its ‘greenhouse’ gas emissions by 80% by 2050. A set of three low-carbon
‘Transition Pathways’ were developed to examine the influence of different governance arrangements on
achieving a low-carbon future. They focus on the power sector, including the potential for increasing use of low-
carbon electricity for heating and transport. These transition pathways were developed by starting from nar-
rative storylines regarding different governance framings, drawing on interviews and workshops with stake-
holders and analysis of historical analogies. Here the quantified pathways are compared and contrasted with the
main scenarios developed in the UK Government's 2011 Carbon Plan. This can aid an informed debate on the
technical feasibility and social acceptability of realising transition pathways for decarbonising the UK energy
sector by 2050. The contribution of these pathways to meeting Britain's energy and carbon reduction goals are
therefore evaluated on a ‘whole systems’ basis, including the implications of ‘upstream emissions’ arising from
the ‘fuel supply chain’ ahead of power generators themselves.
1. Introduction
1.1. Background
The United Kingdom (UK) has set itself on a transition to a low
carbon economy and society, through the imposition of a goal, under
the 2008 Climate Change Act [1], of reducing its ‘greenhouse gas’ (GHG)
emissions by 80% by 2050 (against a 1990 baseline) and the creation of
an institutional framework in order to secure this target. Much atten-
tion has been given to long-term scenarios and pathways for the re-
duction of carbon emissions from the electricity system, because there
exist a range of options for decarbonising electricity generation and
supply. Technological options also exist for the use of low-carbon
electricity for heating and transport (as well as other energy services).
This type of pathway and scenario analysis is therefore useful to enable
‘actors’ to reflect on how current energy system decision-making relates
to the potential for achieving long-term energy and carbon reduction
goals [2]. In the present contribution, a set of low-carbon electricity
pathways developed under a research project (supported by Research
Councils UK and, initially jointly, by E.On UK: the integrated energy
company) are compared and contrasted with ‘official’ pathways de-
veloped by the UK Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) for
the UK Government's Carbon Plan [3]. This Carbon Plan, produced in
2011, set out measures for reducing the GHG emissions from the UK by
50% by the period 2023-27 (from 1990 levels), on a pathway to re-
ducing emissions by 80% by 2050, as required under the 2008 Climate
Change Act [1]. The UK Government is due to produce an updated plan
in 2017, setting out further measures for reducing emissions by 57% by
the period 2028-32.
The low-carbon ‘Transition Pathways’ were developed by the authors
and their colleagues [4,5] to examine the influence of different gov-
ernance arrangements on potential pathways. They follow the main
scenarios developed by the UK Government's independent Committee on
Climate Change (CCC) and DECC, in that they also focus on low-carbon
electrification as the key first step in the transformation of the UK en-
ergy system needed to meet the 80% carbon reduction target for 2050.
However, unlike these scenarios, the Transition Pathways were devel-
oped by starting from narrative storylines around the potential
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consequences of different governance framings, drawing on interviews
and workshops with stakeholders and analysis of historical analogies
[6]. An iterative process of technical elaboration between social science
and engineering researchers, informed by energy system modelling,
was then followed to produce a quantification of the narrative for each
pathway [7,8], as described in Foxon [9] and Robertson et al. [10]. This
yielded a way of examining the potential influence of qualitative social
and institutional and technological changes on the development of low-
carbon pathways [11].
1.2. The transitions approach
The Transition Pathways analysed here drew on a Dutch transitions
approach or transitions theory that has influenced their national policy
on promoting energy system transitions [12–15], and stimulated his-
torical case studies [16], including applications to the Dutch electricity
system [17,18]. It has been used to examine the dynamic interaction of
technological and social factors at different levels [19,20], and has
generated significant international policy and research interest
[4,5,9,11,21–24]. This analytical framework is typically coupled with a
multi-level perspective (MLP) for analysing socio-technical transitions,
based on co-evolution at and between three levels [21,22]: niche in-
novations, socio-technical regimes, and macro-landscape pressures (see, for
example, Fig. 1 [4]). The landscape represents the broader political,
social and cultural values and institutions that form the deep structural
relationships of a society and only change slowly [11]. The socio-tech-
nical regime reflects the prevailing set of routines or practices used by
actors, which create and reinforce a particular technological system
[25]. In contrast, the existing regime is thought of as generating incre-
mental innovation, whilst radical innovations are generated in niches
[11,21,22]. The latter are spaces that are at least partially insulated
from normal market selection in the regime. Niches provide places for
learning processes to occur, and space to build up the social networks
that support innovations, such as supply chains and user-producer re-
lationships. Winskel [26] observed that major system changes often
arise from developments within the existing regime, rather than from
radical innovations at niche-level. He believes that it would be of
greater value to analyse the regime-level dynamics. The representation
of MLP niche-regime interactions might then be improved by the
adoption of ideas and methods stemming from other fields, such as
‘strategic management research’ [26].
The transitions theory or socio-technical approach is not without its
critics [27–33]. Although Shove and Walker [28] recognised the value
of sustainable transitions management for stimulating change towards
predefined beneficial goals, they argued that analyses based on the MLP
typically have an over-simplified view of the social realm, being rooted
in ‘innovation studies’ [26]. In a response, Rotmans and Kemp [29]
noted that it is an approach that has been used in the Netherlands in
particular (see also [12–15,17,18]) to aid the achievement of better
futures. Transitions management helps secure incremental system im-
provements and innovations within the planning framework; often in
the face of complexity and uncertainty. Indeed, Grubler [33] drew on
‘real world’, historical energy transitions in order to highlight the long
duration of transitions (many decades) and their slow rates of change,
the importance of energy end-uses as drivers of change, and the dis-
tinctive patterns needed for the scale-up of technological solutions. But
even Grubler [33] provided cautionary tales. He suggested that low-
carbon transitions require persistence and continuity of policies, their
alignment (e.g., regarding fossil fuel subsidies), and balanced innova-
tion portfolios (e.g., public sector R&D investment and niche market
incentives). Geels and Schot [27] developed a more detailed typology of
transition pathways, focused on refinements to the MLP, in response to
critiques and insights in the academic literature [28–30] that were
followed-up by Geels [31,32]. Although many successful transition
paths reflect a sequence of events [27], they are not automatic or de-
terministic. Many of the pathways may not, in reality, turn out to have a
pure format [27,31,32], and shifts between them can result in those
exhibiting mixed characteristics.
An initial theoretical analysis of past and possible future dec-
arbonisation pathways for the UK [34] showed the potential for the
application of the transitions approach in Britain. Shackley and Green
[34] identified a number of key socio-technical factors that would in-
fluence future pathways in terms of policy drivers for change. They also
argued in favour of policy learning and experimentation in a similar
manner to Winskel [26]. A number of studies have applied the MLP for
a comparative analysis of low-carbon electricity transitions in, for ex-
ample, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK [35,36]. Laes et al. [35]
selected these countries as exemplars of the deployment of renewable
energy technologies (RET), of a transition management framework
[12–14,18], and of legislative commitment to climate change mitiga-
tion [1] respectively. They identified best governance practices, e.g.,
creating communities of interest, target setting to link long-term stra-
tegies with shorter-term (energy or carbon) budgets, and the adoption
of policy incentives. Geels et al. [36] built on the revised typology of
Fig. 1. Possible ‘Transition Pathways’ and the factors
that influence them. (Source: The Transition
Pathways Consortium [4]).
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Geels and Schot [27] in their comparison of Germany and the UK
electricity transitions. They observed that the dominant transition
pathway in Germany was based largely on technological substitution
enacted by new entrants who have led the deployment of small-scale
RET [35]. In contrast, incumbent actors (such as the Big Six electricity
utilities) led the deployment of large-scale RET in the UK. However, the
British policy incentives for RET have recently been significantly wea-
kened with a result that Geels et al. [36] believe it is unlikely that the
UK will meet its current renewable electricity target of 30% by 2020
under the (pre-Brexit) European Union agreement. Likewise, the take-up
of new nuclear power stations and carbon capture and storage (CCS)
facilities coupled to fossil-fuelled power stations and industrial process
plants have been significantly delayed in comparison with what was
envisaged in the original version of the UK Carbon Plan [3]. The delay
by the UK government in publishing its update of the Carbon Plan until
2017 may reflect the challenges in ensuring that the UK remains on
track for further emissions reductions in the late 2020s and early 2030s.
1.3. The issues considered
In this paper, the features and technology implications of the set of
British Transition Pathways for a low carbon electricity system to 2050,
developed by the authors and colleagues, are compared with key sce-
narios produced by the UK Government for meeting its 80% GHG
emissions reduction target by 2050. This aims to provide an overview of
how different framings and assumptions on demand reduction and
generation mix can lead to significantly diverse low-carbon futures.
More detailed discussion of the framing assumptions, demand side and
generation and network implications of the Transition Pathways can be
found in the papers by the project team [5,7–9]. The present con-
tribution focuses on assessing the technical feasibility of these pathways
by examining their outcomes in terms of annual electricity demand and
supply and generation capacity in 2050, and the annual build rates for
different technologies needed to achieve these, in comparison with the
projection in the Carbon Plan scenarios. This aims to inform debate on
the technical feasibility, social acceptability and climate change impact
of the latest version (2.1) of the pathways in relation to how dec-
arbonisation of the UK electricity system can contribute to meeting the
country's energy and carbon reduction goals. Nevertheless, it does not
attempt to draw conclusions on the role or desirability of any particular
technology or pathway. Lessons can be drawn for other European
countries attempting to decarbonise their electricity generation sys-
tems, although local circumstances will limit the wider applicability of
the present findings.
2. Transition Pathways for a UK low carbon electricity system
The ‘Transitions Pathways’ study [5,7–9] approaches pathways from
different governance logics, and technology scenarios are produced
under these perspectives. An initial set of transition pathways for a UK
low carbon energy system were developed by applying three main steps
[4]: (1) characterising the existing energy regime, its internal tensions
and landscape pressures on it; (2) identifying dynamic processes at the
niche level (see again Fig. 1 [4]); and (3) specifying interactions giving
rise to or strongly influencing transition pathways. They were devised
via stakeholder workshops (involving UK energy researchers, in-
dustrialists, and policy advisers and decision-makers), a narrative de-
scriptive of each pathway [9], and their subsequent technical elabora-
tion. Stakeholder workshops were employed by the consortium to
distinguish the logics of three core sets of actors: driven by the market,
central government intervention, and local community initiatives re-
spectively. Consequently, the three transition pathways were named
Market Rules (MR), Central Co-ordination (CC) and Thousand Flowers
(TF); each being dominated by a single group's logic [4,5,9]. Foxon [9]
describes these three pathways, based on different dominant govern-
ance framings:
1) The Market Rules (MR) pathway is based on a governance system
similar to the present one in the UK, with a liberalised and privatised
electricity and gas sector. Thus, the dominant logic is that of the
market, although government objectives are achieved via high-level
policy targets whilst large actors – in this case primarily large energy
companies – deliver them.
2) The Central Co-ordination (CC) pathway represents a world in which
the government comes to the conclusion that meeting security of
supply, affordability and emissions objectives requires direct inter-
vention. This might involve a government agency letting supply
contracts for different low-carbon technology types to develop areas
which are of importance to both the UK grid and in the strategic
interest of the wider economy. In addition, public/private partner-
ships develop the technologies, which lead to significant supply-side
advances in marine renewables, CCS and electric vehicles. On the
demand side, incentives are provided for household energy effi-
ciency, although electrification of heating and transport drives up
electricity demand.
3) The Thousand Flowers (TF) pathway envisages a low-carbon transi-
tion led by civil society. This bottom-up approach focuses on de-
centralised solutions to energy problems and has at its heart a so-
ciety which is aware and informed on environmental issues, and
adopts a proactive approach. Energy service companies (ESCOs) also
emerge, which have incentives more aligned with energy efficiency
improvements that aid the transition to a low-carbon economy.
Full details of the demand and supply projections associated with
version 2.1 of the pathways are presented in a ‘Realising Transition
Pathways’ (RTP) Consortium Working Paper [37]. Nevertheless, the
extent to which the resulting emissions reductions in the electricity
sector contribute to meeting the 80% GHG reduction target depends on
projections of the effectiveness of the technologies used to achieve the
savings, particularly when life-cycle impacts are included (see, for ex-
ample, Hammond et al. [38], who appraised the earlier version 1.1 of
the pathways).
3. Low carbon Transition Pathways – demand projections
The starting point for the quantification of version 2.1 these path-
ways was the projection of annual electricity demand by sector from
2010 to 2050: see Table 1. In the Market Rules pathway, annual elec-
tricity demand rises from 337 Tera Watt hours (TWh) in 2010 to about
512 TWh in 2050 [7,37], due to increasing use of electricity for
Table 1
Electricity used for space heating and hot water in domestic, industry and commerce sectors under the three UK Transition Pathways.
Source: version 2.1 of the UK Transition Pathways; based on calculations by Barton et al. [7]
UK Transition Pathway Market Rules Central Co‐ordination Thousand flowers
Year 2010 2050 2010 2050 2010 2050
Total Electricity for Heat and Hot Water (TWh) 23 108 22 94 22 18
Domestic Electricity for Heat and Hot Water (TWh) 19 73 19 60 18 13
Industrial & Commercial Electricity for Heat and Hot Water (TWh) 3 35 3 34 4 6
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industry, commercial, transport and domestic space heating and hot
water. This means that the electricity system needs to provide 50%
more output by 2050 than it currently does, requiring significant ex-
pansion of low-carbon generation beyond just replacing existing capa-
city.
In contrast, annual electricity demand under the Central Co-ordina-
tion pathway rises from 337 TWh in 2010 to some 410 TWh in 2050
[7,37]. This pathway sees electricity demand rising and then levelling
off from 2030 onwards, due to increasing use of electricity for transport
and domestic space heating and hot water. However, it suggests higher
rates of energy efficiency improvements in the domestic sector, and a
smaller, highly-efficient industrial sector with lower levels of output.
This would imply that some energy-intensive UK production has moved
to other countries, increasing the national consumption of goods pro-
duced abroad, implying that UK carbon emissions calculated on a
consumption basis would continue to diverge from those on a produc-
tion basis (see Barrett et al. [39]).
Finally, under the Thousand Flowers pathway, the annual electricity
demand falls from 337 TWh in 2010 to only around 310 TWh in 2050
[7,37]. Despite similar levels of electrification of transport to that in the
other pathways, electricity demand falls due to even higher rates of
energy efficiency improvements in the domestic and commercial sec-
tors. A large proportion of the resulting domestic space heating and hot
water demand is met by renewable (biogas) community-scale and
micro-scale combined heat and power (CHP) systems, rather than electric
heating systems, helping to reduce electricity demand. In addition, the
power generated by these local-scale CHP systems replaces a significant
proportion of centralised electricity supply. Again, a small, highly-ef-
ficient industrial sector with low levels of output aids the reduction in
electricity demand.
It is clear that in all pathways (see again Table 1) a significant
amount of energy is used in industry and commerce for space heating
and water heating. The provision of this heat is mostly via the same
technologies as in the domestic sector of each pathway but often on a
larger scale. Thus, in the MR and CC pathways, an increasing amount of
electricity is used in heat pumps in the industrial and commercial
sectors. This increase in demand for electricity for heating and hot
water is additional demand to that required for electrification of
transport, and it leads to a significant rise in total final electricity de-
mand in these pathways. However, under the TF pathway, the total
final electricity demand remains stable up to 2050, as the increase in
transport electricity consumption is offset by reductions in demand as a
result of energy efficiency improvements. Thus, there is no rise in
electricity demand for heating and hot water under the TF pathway,
mainly due to the expansion of community-scale renewable CHP.
4. Low carbon Transition Pathways – supply projections
In the ‘Transition Pathways’ study [5,37] the demand projections
for version 2.1 of all three pathways are met by rising levels of low-
carbon electricity generation, including different generation capacities
of renewables, nuclear power and fossil fuels (e.g., coal and gas) with
CCS, operating at different capacity factors. The detailed generation
capacity schedule for each pathway from 2010 to 2050 is reported by
Barnacle et al. [8] and Barton et al. [37]: see Figs. 2 and 3. In 2010, the
UK had around 95 Giga Watts (GW) of electricity generation capacity,
including 29 GW of coal and dual-fuel generation, 33 GW of gas-fired
generation, 11 GW of nuclear power, 9 GW of renewable generation
and 6 GW of combined heat and power (CHP) cogeneration [8,37].
In the Market Rules (MR) pathway, investment occurs in all three
main types of low-carbon generation, driven by a high carbon price.
Significant amounts of capacity come on stream in the 2020s (see
Fig. 2), so that, by 2030, there are 21 GW of coal and gas with CCS,
15 GW of nuclear power and 47 GW of renewables (47 GW); giving a
total capacity of around 130 GW by 2030 [8,37]. Subsequent deploy-
ment leads to further increases in capacity in order to meet rising
electricity demand, particularly from industry and electrification of
heating and transport, over following decades. By 2050, this results in a
total of some 168 GW of capacity, including 44 GW of coal and gas
generation with CCS, 26 GW of nuclear power, and 80 GW of renewable
capacity, principally from onshore (23 GW) and offshore (30 GW) wind
turbines, tidal power (12 GW) and renewable CHP (9 GW). This pro-
vides a total supply for the MR pathway of about 539 TWh in 2050
[8,37].
There are similar investments during the 2020s in all types of low-
carbon generation capacity under the Central Co-ordination (CC)
pathway (see Fig. 3); co-ordinated by what might perhaps be a Strategic
Energy Agency. This leads to a total of some 122 GW in 2030, though
with high levels of nuclear power (22 GW), and slightly lower levels of
coal and gas-fired power generation with CCS (18 GW) and renewables
(43 GW) [8,37]. Despite the subsequent levelling off of demand under
this pathway, further deployment is needed to increase the capacity to a
total of around 151 GW by 2050, of which the largest single contribu-
tion comes from nuclear power (30 GW). There are similar investments
(30 GW) in coal and gas-fired generation with CCS, but this operates at
a lower capacity factor (36%), as it partly provides back-up to inter-
mittent renewables. There is a total of 65 GW of renewable generation,
of which the largest contributions are from onshore (21 GW) and off-
shore (17 GW) wind. This provides a total supply of about 427 TWh in
2050 [8,37]. Finally, in the Thousand Flowers (TF) pathway, action by
community groups and local and regional ESCOs leads to a significant
expansion of community-based and micro-scale renewable CHP in-
stalled from 2020 onwards, reaching a total of 37 GW by 2030 (see
Fig. 4). The total capacity under the TF pathway reaches around
149 GW by 2050 [8,37]. This is similar to that of CC pathway, but most
of the capacity is made up of renewable generation (112 GW). As noted
above, a significant proportion of demand under the TF pathway is met
Fig. 2. Generation capacity in the Market Rules pathway (Source: Version 2.1; based on
Barnacle et al. [8]).
Fig. 3. Generation capacity in the Central Co-ordination pathway (Source: Version 2.1;
based on Barnacle et al. [8]).
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by local-scale renewables, reducing the need for centralised electricity
supply. The largest single contribution to generation comes from re-
newable (biogas) community-scale and micro-CHP systems (44 GW),
followed by onshore wind turbines (21 GW), solar photovoltaic (PV)
arrays (16 GW), and offshore wind ‘farms’ (8 GW). There is some in-
vestment in other low-carbon generation technologies in earlier per-
iods, resulting in 22 GW of coal and gas-fired power plant with CCS and
5 GW of nuclear capacity by 2050. This provides a total supply of some
313 TWh in 2050 [8,37].
5. UK Carbon Plan pathways
5.1. Background
The Carbon Plan [3] sets out the range of measures and incentives
that the UK Government intends to put in place in order to ensure that
the country is on track to meet the target of reducing its GHG emissions
by 80% by 2050, as required by the Climate Change Act [1]. It also seeks
to address the so-called energy policy ‘trilemma’: “to make the transition
to a low carbon economy, whilst maintaining energy security and
minimising costs to consumers, particularly those in poorer house-
holds” [3]. Thus, the main focus of the Carbon Plan [3] is the additional
measures needed to meet the Fourth Carbon Budget [40], covering 2023-
27, which was set into law 12 years in advance. It requires UK GHG
emissions to be reduced by 50% below 1990 levels by 2023-27. The
main measures that initially aimed to achieve this included the so-
called ‘Green Deal’ [41], a scheme for households to finance energy
efficiency improvements at no upfront cost which began operating in
January 2013 (but which was subsequently stopped by the UK Gov-
ernment in October 2015, because the take-up was claimed to have
been too low), and the Electricity Market Reform (EMR) programme [40]
for stimulating investment in low carbon electricity generation. The
latter was embodied in the Energy Act 2013 [42], and negotiations with
the French energy company EDF have provided a guaranteed ‘strike
price’ for two initial new nuclear power stations, under the new ‘Con-
tract for Difference (CfD) Feed-in Tariffs’; a key part of the reforms.
Thus, the main challenge for the UK government will be to balance
these incentives for investment in low-carbon generation (including
renewables, nuclear and CCS demonstrators) with ensuring energy se-
curity and maintaining affordability of energy to consumers. This faces
a number of uncertainties, such as future levels of energy service de-
mand - which depend on up-take of energy efficiency measures and
end-use technologies and levels of economic activity - and the technical
and economic feasibility and acceptability of a range of low-carbon
energy options, particularly for electricity generation. The Carbon Plan
[3] therefore explored four 2050 futures, which are potential scenarios
that could meet the 80% GHG reduction target by 2050. The first is
based on a ‘core’ simulation run of the UK MARKAL cost-optimising
energy system model, and the three other scenarios were developed
using the DECC 2050 Calculator tool [43]: (i) ‘Higher renewables, more
energy efficiency’, (ii) ‘Higher nuclear, less energy efficiency’, and (iii)
‘Higher CCS, more bioenergy’ futures respectively.
5.2. Key features of the DECC energy scenarios
In the core UK MARKAL (updated UK MARKAL 3.26) scenario, the
cost-optimised parameterisation indicates a sharp reduction in overall
per capita energy demand, thanks to end-use energy efficiency im-
provements and switch to more efficient electric heating and vehicles.
However, as a result, electricity demand rises by 46% to 433 TWh by
2050 (see Fig. 5), and almost all of this needs to be met by low carbon
generation sources. Under this core UK MARKAL scenario, by 2050,
capacity rises to a total of 112 GW, including 31 GW of nuclear, 25 GW
of coal, biomass and gas generation with carbon sequestration, and
49 GW of renewable generation, with 7.5 GW of standby/peaking gas
capacity (see Fig. 6). This provides a total of 560 TWh of supply, of
which 89 TWh is exported. This is driven by the expansion of the use of
low carbon electricity in transport for electric vehicles and in heating
via air- and ground-source heat pumps, as well as for domestic and
industrial power and lighting services. This core UK MARKAL scenario
implies an overall increase in the average capacity factor of electricity
generation from 43% in 2010 to 58% in 2050; thanks partly to a pro-
jected capacity factor of 80% for new nuclear power stations. It reflects
a rapid expansion of onshore and offshore wind to 2030 to replace
declining coal capacity, though there remains significant combined cycle
gas turbine (CCGT) capacity out to 2030. Nuclear power capacity ex-
pands rapidly after 2030 to become three times as large as current
nuclear capacity by 2050. There is a slower expansion of solid
Fig. 4. Generation capacity in the Thousand Flowers pathway (Source: Version 2.1; based
on Barnacle et al. [8]).
Fig. 5. Electricity demand (TWh) in 2050 under the DECC energy scenarios (left) and the
three UK Transition Pathways (right).
Fig. 6. Generation capacity (GW) for the DECC scenarios and the three UK Transition
Pathways in 2050, including peaking gas, interconnection and pumped storage in the
DECC scenarios.
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hydrocarbons (solid HC; roughly equal coal and biomass) with pre- and
post-combustion coal CCS, and CCGT (roughly equal quantities of
natural gas and biogas) with CCS after 2030. There are significant
contributions after 2030 from offshore renewables, including tidal
range, tidal stream and wave power, and a maintained capacity of
offshore wind, though the amount of onshore wind reduces (see
Table 2).
The three other variants of the DECC scenarios were developed
using the DECC 2050 Calculator tool [43]: (i) ‘Higher renewables, more
energy efficiency’, (ii) ‘Higher nuclear, less energy efficiency’, and (iii)
‘Higher CCS, more bioenergy’ futures respectively. Under scenario (i)
there are significant improvements in energy efficiency in homes and
industry. However, there is also a high degree of electrification in
transportation, space heating and hot water, and industry. This leads to
a 45 per cent increase in electricity-demand from 2010 to a value of
490 TWh in 2050 [37,43]: see again Fig. 5. To meet this growth, gen-
erating capacity including balancing generation increases by 161% over
the same period to reach 210 GW (see Fig. 6). This is the highest
electricity generation capacity of all the scenarios with renewables
dominating the system and accounting for 52% of capacity including
backup in 2050. Of the renewables in this scenario, most of the capacity
is in onshore and offshore wind; 28.4 and 54 GW by 2050. They have
comparatively low load factors (30% for onshore wind and 45% for
offshore wind) and therefore require increased capacity to meet the
demand. In addition, this ‘Higher renewables, more energy efficiency’
scenario requires a significant proportion of the capacity to be ac-
counted for by generation capacity having a grid balancing function:
24.4 GW of gas, 20 GW of storage, and 30 GW of interconnection (see
again Fig. 6).
The ‘Higher nuclear, less energy efficiency’ future (ii) sees a very
limited effort to reduce energy demand across the economy through
behaviour change or energy efficiency measures. Large-scale elec-
trification of transport and heating drives increases in electricity de-
mand, which increases by 60%. Of the four DECC scenarios, the elec-
tricity demand in 2050 is the highest a 555 TWh [37,43]: see Fig. 5.
However, electricity generation capacity growth grows by only 51% to
reach 123 GW, which is less than the increase in demand because of the
high penetration of nuclear generation in 2050 with a high capacity
factor of 80%. This deployment of nuclear increases the average ca-
pacity factor of generation on the grid. Due to the long ‘lead times’ for
nuclear, significant new rollout does not begin until around 2025.
3.2 GW of new plant is added to the system by 2020, although some
6.4 GW of legacy plant is closed in the previous 10 years. Consequently
there is a minimum penetration of nuclear power at this time. New
nuclear build rates are ramped so that beyond 2025 to almost 2.5 GW of
new plant is built per year. 75 GW of nuclear plant are installed by 2050
(see again Fig. 6), by which time the electricity generation system is
dominated by nuclear power; accounting for 61% of capacity [37,43].
There is also a small, but significant, role played by storage, inter-
connection and gas power in 2050: 11.3 GW of back-up gas capacity,
4 GW of storage, and 10 GW of interconnection.
Finally, the ‘Higher CCS, more bioenergy’ scenario (iii) results in a
medium requirement for investment in energy efficiency measures.
Likewise, there is only limited electrification of transportation leading
to minimal growth in annual electricity demand to 461 TWh in 2050
[37,43] (see Fig. 5); an increase of 34% on 2010 levels. The generation
capacity added by 2030 is primarily from the renewables, which offsets
the decline of coal, as natural gas stays roughly flat. Over the same
period, new nuclear build compensates for legacy plant closures. From
2030 onwards, when a large deployment of CCS is assumed to com-
mence, with new build rate increases to around 1.5 GW per year
[37,43]. Over the same time, natural gas declines rapidly to zero in
2045 being replaced by biogas, while nuclear power begins to accu-
mulate on the system and the proportion of capacity accounted for by
nuclear plant increases. Between 2045 and 2050 the expansion of CCS
drives generation capacity up to its highest level over the modelled
period [37,43]. Biomass co-firing with coal CCS and biogas CCS implies
the potential for net negative carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions. The high
capacity factor of CCS (~85%) means that generation capacity of this
type can have a large impact on generation. While electricity generation
matches electricity demand (plus losses) for most of the modelled
period, the large increases in capacity from 2045 to 2050 result in ex-
cess electricity production and net exports of 14.7 TWh [37,43].
6. Comparison between the Transition Pathways and the DECC
scenarios
The UK demand for electricity in 2050 under all seven scenarios
considered here are compared in Fig. 5. The Thousand Flowers pathway
is the only one in which electricity demand decreases from 2010 to
2050. The one in which demand is the largest is the second of the DECC
scenarios (II: ‘Higher nuclear’; Fig. 5), which focuses on nuclear power
and does not prioritise energy efficiency. The comparison between
these pathways and scenarios suggests that, in the absence of a moti-
vated civil society which takes responsibility for climate change miti-
gation, electricity demand reductions are unlikely to be secured. This
applies even with very high levels of energy efficiency, as seen in the
first DECC alternative scenarios (I: ‘Higher renewables’; see again Fig. 5)
– a higher renewables, higher energy efficiency future. However, this
latter scenario is not inconsistent with 80 per cent GHG emissions re-
ductions by 2050.
Assumed capacity factors for each of the generation pathways/sce-
narios are important because they affect the amount (GW) of capacity
that is necessary for the operation of the UK electricity grid, and in-
fluence the amount of demand-side management and the back-up re-
quirements for the grid. A comparison of the maximum capacity factors
for the DECC scenarios and Transition Pathways are shown in Table 3.
The resulting generation capacity for the different pathways/scenarios,
including back-up gas capacity, storage and interconnection in the case
of the DECC scenarios, are shown in Fig. 6. Although all except the
Thousand Flowers pathway rely heavily on CCS, nuclear and wind, there
is seen to be quite a diverse variation in generation mixes. Renewable
power plants have lower capacity factors, and those mixes with a large
amount of this type of generation therefore tend to require a higher
generating capacity. All of the pathways/scenarios, except the higher
CCS scenario, show a large increase in generation capacity by 2050 over
Table 2
Approximate number of plants required to meet installed capacity in core UK MARKAL
scenario.
Source: RTP Working Paper 2013/5 (Barton et al. [10]); HC - hydrocarbon
2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 Description
Coal 14 8 1 0 0 2 GW plant
Biomass 12 12 12 12 0 50 MW Plant
Gas CCGT 26 24 24 8 0 1 GW plant
Solid HC CCS
Pre Comb
0 0 1 4 8 1.2 GW locations
Solid HC CCS
Post Comb
0 1 3 5 6 1.2 GW locations
Gas CCGT with
CCS
0 0 2 4 7 1.2 GW locations
Nuclear 6 4 8 14 20 1.5 GW plant
Wind (onshore) 1623 4363 4723 3183 2413 2.5 MW Turbines
Wind (offshore) 232 1592 3154 3345 3103 5.8 MW Turbines
Hydro 16 17 18 18 19 100 MW Sites
Wave 0 54 268 2410 6427 1.5 MW Machines
Tidal Stream 1 17 152 1037 2854 Approximate number of
1.2 MW ‘Seagen’
devices
Tidal Range 0 2 10 31 31 Approximate number of
240 MW tidal range
sites
Standby/Peak
Gas
0 0 3 7 4 2 GW Plant
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the present level of around 90 GW.
Back-up generation makes no contribution to annual electricity
generation figures according to the modelling undertaken using the
DECC 2050 Calculator [43]. Consequently, the capacity factors for gas
in the DECC scenarios and the Transition Pathways, based on the cal-
culated generation data, reduce to close to zero by 2050. When the need
for back-up generation is included in capacity factor calculations, the
capacity factors for gas power stations in the DECC scenarios move
closer to those in the Transition Pathways estimates, but there are still
considerable differences between the pathways/scenarios. However,
the gas generation capacities in the models are broadly similar, at least
until 2030 (see Table 4).
Annual UK electricity generated in 2010 and 2050 according to the
DECC scenarios and Transition Pathways are shown for comparison
purposes in Fig. 7. This suggests that the total electricity generation in
2050 for the Market Rules pathway is similar to that for the MARKAL
scenario, though with a higher proportion of renewables. The total
generation is lower under the Central Co-ordination pathway, and sig-
nificantly lower in the Thousand Flowers pathway: falling below the
output in 2010, despite the expansion of electric vehicles in this
pathway.
7. Technology implications
7.1. The context
Many challenges facing the British energy sector [5] will require a
portfolio of energy options to surmount them: energy demand reduction
and efficiency improvements, fossil fuel power plants with CCS, and a
switch to low or zero carbon energy sources [such as CHP, nuclear
power stations, and renewable energy technologies on a large and small
scale]. The above comparisons show that all the pathways/scenarios
imply high levels of deployment of some or all of the low-carbon gen-
eration technologies, as well as significant differences in the take-up of
energy efficiency improvements. Such improvements result from using
less energy for the same level of output or service, where the output can
be measured in terms of either physical or economic units (i.e., tonnes
or pounds sterling). But consumers can also be encouraged to reduce
their energy use by changing their service demands. One obvious way
of doing that is via the adoption of a lower comfort temperature in the
home or at the workplace, thereby requiring less energy to deliver it.
Human behavioural changes of this type can be aided by the in-
troduction of regulatory interventions (e.g., on boilers), fiscal measures,
or by devices such as ‘smart’ meters or appliances.
In general, the build-up of energy efficiency improvement measures
can be deployed at a much faster rate than supply technologies. They
have been incorporated into the demand-side modelling associated with
the development of the Transition Pathways [37]. Thus, the present
section considers the implied deployment rates (or ‘build rates’) for
some of the key low-carbon power technologies under the different
pathways/scenarios. This is done by reference to the deployment tra-
jectory levels within the DECC 2050 Calculator [43], which range from
Level 1 (little or no effort being made) to Level 4 (extremely ambitious
targets) that push towards the technical or physical limits of what can
be achieved.
7.2. Key low carbon power technologies
7.2.1. Nuclear power
The core MARKAL and ‘higher nuclear, less energy efficiency’ sce-
narios, as well as the MR and CC pathways, all imply a significant ex-
pansion of British nuclear capacity from the current value of 11 GW
from around 2030 onwards. The ‘higher renewables, more energy effi-
ciency’ and ‘higher CCS, more bioenergy’ scenarios show a smaller in-
crease in nuclear capacity. Only in the TF pathway, does nuclear play
no significant role (in line with DECC 2050 Calculator [43] baseline
trajectory, i.e., Level 1). Rising nuclear generation capacity reflects the
UK Government's belief that nuclear power has a role to play in the
future UK energy mix, alongside other low carbon technologies. They
seek to encourage energy utility companies to invest in new nuclear
build [44]. In order to meet the deployment levels seen in the path-
ways/scenarios there would need to be clear support by both the public
and government, with regulatory certainty regarding the acceptability
of reactor design and market certainty; thereby giving operators’ con-
fidence that they will see a return over the lifetime of the project [43].
The consequent installed capacity and annual build rates for all the
pathways/scenarios are illustrated in Figs. 6 and 8 respectively [37].
The DECC (ii) scenario (‘Higher nuclear, less energy efficiency’) suggest
the highest build rates of any of the pathways/scenarios considered
Table 3
Maximum UK power generator capacity factors in 2050 under the different models/sce-
narios/pathways. Sources: 1DECC 2050 Pathways [16]; 2RTP Working Paper 2013/5
(Barton et al. [10]).
DECC scenarios1 Transition Pathways2
Coal 60% 48%
Gas 70% 56%
Oil 6% 13%
CCS 85% 90%
Nuclear 80% 61%
Onshore wind 30% 29%
Offshore wind 45% 43%
Hydro 38% 37%
Biomass 90% 61%
Wave 23% 28%
Tidal range 20–24% 24%
Tidal stream 40% 24%
Solar 10% 11%
NB: (1) The capacity factor of an electricity generating plant is ratio of the average power
generated divided by the rated peak power (or full ‘nameplate’ capacity over the same
period of time).
(2) The Transition Pathways capacity factors are the maximum values across the three
pathways.
Table 4
Gas capacity (GW) in 2030 and 2050 for different pathways/scenarios. Source: 1DECC
2050 Pathways [16]; 2RTP Working Paper 2013/5 (Barton et al. [10])
Pathways/Scenarios 2030 2050
DECC I – Renewables1 25.5 24.0
DECC II – Nuclear1 30.5 11.0
DECC III – CCS1 21.9 0.0
Market Rules2 26.7 0.0
Central Co-ordination2 20.7 5.4
Thousand Flowers2 20.7 15.0
Fig. 7. Annual UK electricity generation (TWh) in 2010 and 2050 under the DECC sce-
narios and the three UK Transition Pathways.
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here (see Fig. 8). However, the high capital costs of new nuclear power
stations (particularly when taking into account so-called ‘back end’
costs [45], such as for decommissioning and waste disposal), as well as
continuing public concern over safety, waste management and nuclear
proliferation, remain significant barriers to a large scale-up of nuclear
power in the UK. The construction of the first new nuclear power in the
UK for over 20 years began in 2016, following the signing of contracts
between the UK Government, EDF and China General Nuclear (CGN) for
the ‘Hinkley Point C’ (HPC) nuclear power station, which is predicted to
take 10 years to build.
7.2.2. Carbon capture and storage
CCS plays a significant role in most of the pathways/scenarios, and
accounts for a similar percentage of the total generation in all the
scenarios, except the Thousand Flowers pathway and the DECC ‘Higher
nuclear’ scenario. Installed capacities and annual build rates for CCS
plants across all the pathways/scenarios are illustrated in Figs. 6 and 9
respectively [37]. Annual build rates are marginally higher under the
three Transition Pathways than the DECC scenarios (see Fig. 9), but not
unrealistically so. However, there is an energy penalty associated with
CO2 capture that reduces the overall efficiency of the power plant. In
the DECC 2050 Calculator [43], this is assumed to range initially from
13% to 27%, depending on the type of power plant, gas, pre-combus-
tion solid or post-combustion solid. This energy penalty is assumed to
reduce, as the efficiency of the capture process improves, to 12–16%
from 2020 [46,47]. In addition, attention must be given to the reduc-
tion of carbon emissions by installing CCS technology. The DECC 2050
Calculator [43] assumes that 90% of CO2 emissions are captured, but
research by the Transition Pathways team shows that, when life-cycle
effects are taken into account, this can reduce to a 70% capture rate
over the life-cycle [38,48]. The UK Government is currently working
with industry to support the development of a cost-competitive CCS
industry in the 2020s, through a £1 billion commercialisation compe-
tition [47], support for R&D and innovation, and the EMR programme,
though only a small number of small-scale CO2 capture demonstrations
have so far been implemented [3]. However, the £1 billion support for a
CCS demonstration project was withdrawn by the UK Government in
2015, creating uncertainty over the future of this technology in the UK.
7.2.3. Onshore wind turbines
In the core MARKAL scenario, 0.7 GW of onshore wind are added
annually from 2010 to 2025, with 0.3 GW added annually thereafter
[43]. However, as turbines are only projected to have lifetimes of 20
years, this is below the replacement rate, and so the installed capacity
peaks at 13 GW in 2025, reducing to 6 GW by 2050. This corresponds to
a maximum of over 4700 turbines of size 2.5 MW, reducing to around
2400 turbines by 2050. A similar final level of deployment of 21–23 GW
by 2050 is seen in all three Transition Pathways, although the deploy-
ment is more uniformly timed, with only 14–15 GW of installed capa-
city by 2030. It is assumed that onshore wind will be present in the
form of both large-scale wind farms and smaller-scale community wind
projects [22]. The key support mechanisms for reaching the high de-
ployment levels was the Renewables Obligation until 2017, and then the
CfD Feed-in Tariffs, which was implemented from 2014 [40]. However,
obtaining local planning permission remains a difficult issue, because of
local resistance to wind turbine in the rural landscape, mainly due to
aesthetic concerns.
7.2.4. Offshore wind turbines
In the core MARKAL scenario, rates of installation of offshore wind
farms increases from 0.7 GW per year to 1.2 GW per year by 2025,
thereafter levelling off at 0.9 GW added per year (equalling the re-
placement rate). Installed capacities and annual build rates for offshore
wind across all the pathways/scenarios are illustrated in Figs. 6 and 10
respectively [37]. This implies that offshore wind capacity increases to
18 GW by 2030, before remaining approximately constant to 2050.
That corresponds to a maximum of over 3100 turbines of a typical size
of 5.8 MW (see Table 2 for details of the approximate number of plants
required to meet installed capacity core UK MARKAL scenario). In
contrast, the MR pathway leads to 30 GW of installed capacity by 2050
(see Fig. 6), though with a more even ramp-up, reaching 15 GW by
2030. Lower rates of installation are seen in the other two pathways
[37], only reaching 17 GW of offshore wind by 2050 in the CC pathway
and 8 GW of offshore wind by 2050 in the TF pathway. In order to reach
the high level deployment of offshore wind farms, the UK Government
is supporting technology innovation and demonstration, supply chain
development, access to finance through the Green Investment Bank
[3,44], planning and consenting, grid connection, and incentives for
investment under the Renewables Obligation until 2017 and CfD feed-in
tariffs under EMR programme implemented after 2014 [3,40].
Fig. 8. Annual build rates (MW/year) for nuclear power to 2050 in the UK MARKAL
projections, the DECC scenarios and the three Transition Pathways (net of closures to
2030).
Fig. 9. Annual build rates (MW/year) for fossil-fuelled [coal and gas] power plants with
carbon capture and storage (CCS) to 2050 in the UK MARKAL projections, the DECC
scenarios and the three Transition Pathways.
Fig. 10. Annual build rates (MW/year) for offshore wind to 2050 in the UK MARKAL, the
DECC scenarios and the three Transition Pathways.
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7.3. Other low carbon power options
7.3.1. Tidal power
Tidal range has the potential to meet 13% of our electricity demand
if fully exploited [3,42] and is present in all but the DECC nuclear and
CCS pathways. The highest deployment is seen in the core MARKAL and
Market Rules pathways with around 7.5 GW of tidal range and 5.7 GW
of tidal stream installed capacity in 2050. The tidal range capacity
equates around 31 sites comparable to the 240 MW la Rance site in
Brittany (France), the only significant tidal range site presently in op-
eration [42]. The use of technology that utilises the tidal range is well-
established and typically has an estimated lifetime of 120 years [49].
The capital costs would be recouped, but only with very long pay-back
periods [49]. The Severn Estuary is seen as one of the premium loca-
tions in the world for its tidal range but, due to these cost considera-
tions, as well as the local environmental impacts, the UK Government
decided that a proposed 8.64 GW Severn tidal power barrage was not
required to meet 2020 renewable energy targets [49]. They argued that
it should not be supported by public funds at the present time, although
the project may still be considered in the future [3]. However, plans for
a 320 MW tidal lagoon ‘pathfinder’ power plant in Swansea Bay, which
aims to begin construction in 2018, have been supported by a gov-
ernment-commissioned review [49].
7.3.2. Wave power and tidal stream devices
These are emerging technologies with the UK at the forefront of
R&D through the National Renewable Energy Centre, the European
Marine Energy Centre and the WaveHub demonstration facility [3]. In
order to achieve commercial deployment of wave and tidal stream
devices, pre-commercial demonstration sites have been recently de-
ployed, with subsequent commercial deployment [42]. The core
MARKAL pathway implies the highest deployment with 9.6 GW of wave
power from over 6,400 devices and 5.7 GW of tidal stream energy from
2,850 turbines by 2050 (see again Table 2). Consequently, the UK
government's priority actions for all marine energy systems are mana-
ging the risk and costs of RD&D, securing investment for commercial
deployment, developing supply chain infrastructure, and ensuring
planning and consenting.
7.3.3. Bioenergy
In each of the DECC scenarios, the biomass power station level is
fixed at 0.6 GW capacity in the form of co-fired power stations up to
2030; followed by dedicated biomass combustion. Biomass is also
coupled with CHP, but without clearly defined inputs or capacities. In
the Transition Pathways, biomass is largely used in community CHP
plant, with around 10 GW of biogas CHP co-generation by 2050 in the
MR and CC pathways, compared to over 52 GW of biogas CHP in the
TF pathway [37]. This represents the most significant difference be-
tween any of the pathways/scenarios. The biogas CHP (community
scale and micro-CHP) would meets around 63% of home and com-
mercial heating demand under the TF pathway, providing 112 TWh of
distributed electricity generation. Assuming a low electrical capacity
factor of 30% for home and commercial CHP, together with industrial
renewable CHP, this corresponds to 52 GW of installed CHP capacity
by 2050 (see again Fig. 6 – ‘renewable CHP’). The biomass availability
in order to meet this capacity is regarded as being constrained within
the UK [50]. Until recently, there has been little policy support
available for CHP in the UK, but the Renewable Heat Incentive, which
has been in place for non-domestic properties from 2011 and for do-
mestic properties from 2014, includes support for renewable micro-
CHP. The UK Government is also supporting work in a number of large
UK cities to determine the potential for community-scale heat net-
works.
8. Projections of ‘greenhouse gas’ emissions under the Transition
Pathways
The UK MARKAL and DECC scenarios [43] seek to achieve an 80%
reduction in GHG emissions for the whole UK economy by 2050
(against a 1990 baseline). For this to occur, the remaining CO2 emis-
sions from fuel combustion need to be almost completely cancelled out
by the capture and storage of GHG emissions, and by presumed ‘negative
emissions’ associated with the use of bioenergy with CCS. However, it is
difficult to make a direct comparison with the Transition Pathways as the
latter only cover the electricity sector. All three pathways have been
evaluated in terms of their life-cycle energy and environmental per-
formance within a wider sustainability framework [38,48]. An in-
tegrated approach was used to assess the impact of these pathways,
employing both energy analysis and environmental life-cycle assess-
ment (LCA), applied on a whole systems basis: from ‘cradle-to-gate’.
Thus this analysis accounted for both upstream and operational activ-
ities right through to the point of delivery to the consumer, as described
in Hammond et al. [38]. Upstream environmental burdens arise from
the need to expend energy resources in order to extract and deliver fuel
to a power station or other users. They include the energy requirements
for extraction, processing/refining, transport, and fabrication, as well as
methane leakages from coal mining activities – a major contribution –
and natural gas pipelines. GHG emissions, measured as carbon dioxide
equivalent (CO2e) emissions, are one of 18 environmental impacts ex-
amined as part of this LCA study. The various life-cycle stages and
processes within the system boundaries of the present study are illu-
strated in Fig. 11. The LCA software package was used to evaluate the
environmental impacts of the Transition Pathways [48,51]. Projected
‘whole systems’ GHG emissions for the UK electricity supply industry
(ESI) - both upstream and operational (or ‘stack’) emissions - can be
seen here in Fig. 12. (Additionally, ‘whole systems’ GHG emissions per
kilo Watt hour (kWh) [gCO2e/kWhe] of electricity produced were ob-
tained [10]). Similar trends were seen by Hammond et al. [38] relating
to version 1.1 of the pathways, although with less decarbonisation
achieved by 2050. The present results relate to most recent version 2.1
of the pathways.
The 80% GHG emissions reduction target for the UK by 2050 only
relates to territorial emissions [39]. These emissions are the result of
direct operational activities only, i.e., those resulting from the fuel
burnt at the site of the power generator. Consequently, the associated
upstream activities are excluded, making direct emissions the primary
focus. Direct GHG emissions projected for the UK ESI is shown in Fig. 13
(while the direct GHG emissions projected per kWh of electricity are
reported by Barton et al. [37]). Clearly, by comparing Figs. 12 and 13, it
can easily be observed that upstream emissions have a significant im-
pact on the environmental performance of the electricity grid mix in all
three pathways. About a third more emissions were actually emitted in
2008, and over three times the emissions for thousand flowers pathway
in 2050. According to this analysis, the UK ESI was estimated to emit
230 million tonnes of GHG emissions in 2008 on a whole systems basis.
The corresponding grid mix had a carbon intensity of 656 gCO2e/kWhe
[37], although again this was much lower on an operational basis only.
The UK Government's independent Committee on Climate Change
(CCC) has advocated deep cuts in power sector operational emissions
through the 2020s [40], with UK electricity generation largely dec-
arbonised by 2030–2040. In contrast, the present Transition Pathways
(see again Figs. 12 and 13) projections indicate that the UK ESI could
not be fully decarbonised by 2050 on the ‘whole systems’ basis em-
ployed in the present analysis [48]. The disparity between the direct
and whole systems emissions is largely due to the fact that both the CCC
and DECC don’t currently take account of upstream emissions. How-
ever, even considering just direct GHG emissions, only the Thousand
Flowers pathway is likely to achieve near complete decarbonisation of
the electricity sector by 2050 (see Fig. 13). The pathways thus illustrate
the stringent challenge facing the ESI in order to bear its fair (global)
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share of the overall 80% carbon reduction target by 2050. The CCC
analysis suggests that an optimal scenario to reach this target would
require average operational emissions from generation to fall to around
50gCO2e/kWhe by 2030 (CCC, 2010). Of the three Transition Pathways,
only the TF pathway is projected to reach this target, with GHG emis-
sions falling to 49 gCO2e/kWhe by 2030. In contrast, the MR and CC
pathways indicate, accounting for direct emissions only, falling to
around 109 gCO2e/kWhe and 74 gCO2e/kWhe respectively by 2030
[37].
9. Concluding remarks
This paper has provided support for the technical feasibility of the
Transition Pathways, developed by the authors and colleagues [5,9,11],
by showing that the required technological build rates to achieve a UK
low carbon electricity system by 2050 are comparable to those assumed
in the UK Government's Carbon Plan scenarios [3,43]. The outcomes in
terms of generation capacity and annual electricity generation in 2050
are also broadly comparable, with the exception of the Thousand
Flowers pathway, which projects a lower level of electricity generation
in 2050, due to achieving greater reductions in electricity demand.
Nevertheless, the findings illustrate the scale and urgency of deploy-
ment of key technologies that would be needed to realise any of these
pathways. For example, theMarket Rules pathway would require annual
build rates for carbon capture and storage (CCS) of 1900 MW/year from
2025 to 2035. This would now seem to be at the limit of technical
feasibility, given that the UK Government abandoned its £1 billion
support for a CCS demonstration plant in 2015.
Both the Thousand Flowers and Central Co-ordination pathways pro-
ject fast progress in restraining electricity demand [5,7,9] will require
technological or behavioural energy efficiency measures in order to
reduce the levels of generation deployment needed out to 2050. It has
been shown here that the challenges facing the realisation of any of the
pathways/scenarios examined will need rapid rates of deployment of
some or all of the available key low carbon electricity generation op-
tions. Version 2.1 of the UK Transition Pathways have been shown to
have levels of deployment broadly comparable to those in the DECC
scenarios, though with rates of renewable deployment in the Market
Rules pathway falling between those of the core UK MARKAL scenario
and the DECC ‘higher renewables, more energy efficiency’ scenario. The
Central Co-ordination and Thousand Flowers pathways have lower levels
of electricity demand than the DECC scenarios, due to greater energy
efficiency improvements, However, these still imply high installed ca-
pacities, due to the greater proportion of renewable generation with
lower capacity factors. The most significant difference is the high level
of renewable CHP (both community scale and micro-CHP) in the TF
pathway. This reduces the amount of centralised generation needed to
Fig. 11. System boundary diagram of the life-cycle
['cradle-to-gate'] carbon emissions assessment of the
UK Transition Pathways (Source: Adapted from
Hammond et al. [51]).
Fig. 12. Projected UK ‘Whole Systems’ [operational (‘stack’) plus upstream] GHG
Emissions for the Electricity Sector (MtCO2e) 1990–2050 under the three Transition
Pathways (Source: Version 2.1; calculations by Hammond and O'Grady [48]).
Fig. 13. Projected UK Direct GHG Emissions for the Electricity Sector (MtCO2e)
1990–2050 under the three Transition Pathways.
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meet electric heating demand, as well as the power generated by this
form of distributed generation. It significantly offsets the level of cen-
tralised generation needed in this pathway.
Upstream environmental burdens (expressed as CO2e emissions)
associated with various power generators and UK electricity transition
pathways towards a low carbon future have been evaluated on a ‘whole
systems’ basis [37,38,48,51]. CO2e capture facilities coupled to fossil-
fuelled plants were found, for example, to deliver only a 70% reduction
in GHG emissions (including both upstream and operational emissions),
in contrast to the normal presumption of a 90% saving. In addition, the
present UK GHG trajectories associated with transition pathways out to
2050 are found to differ significantly from those produced by both
DECC and the British Government's independent Committee on Climate
Change. These bodies do not currently account for upstream, ‘fugitive’
GHG emissions. Thus, there will actually remain further emissions up-
stream that are unaccounted for, even if the current UK CO2e reduction
targets are apparently met.
The present comparison exercise highlights the fact that sig-
nificantly different technological pathways to a low carbon electricity
system in the UK by 2050 are possible, though any of these pathways
will be challenging to realise. They imply different levels of efforts and
different patterns of risks and uncertainties, in relation to energy effi-
ciency and behavioural changes and in technology choices and de-
ployment challenges. How these are addressed and resolved will de-
pend on the governance arrangements of the transition including policy
measures and regulatory frameworks. So, as discussed in more detail
elsewhere [5,9,52,53], the roles and choices of government, market and
civil society actors are crucial to realising any of these pathways. These
choices will be affected by expectations of the technical feasibility and
social acceptability of future pathways, which can be informed by the
type of analysis presented here. There are obvious lessons from this
work for other European countries attempting to decarbonise their
electricity generation systems, although local circumstances will limit
the wider applicability of the present findings.
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